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How we make decisions that have direct consequences for
ourselves and others forms the moral foundation of our society.
Whereas economic theory contends that humans aim at maximiz-
ing their own gains, recent seminal psychological work suggests
that our behavior is instead hyperaltruistic: We are more willing to
sacrifice gains to spare others from harm than to spare ourselves
from harm. To investigate how such egoistic and hyperaltruistic
tendencies influence moral decision making, we investigated
trade-off decisions combining monetary rewards and painful elec-
tric shocks, administered to the participants themselves or an
anonymous other. Whereas we replicated the notion of hyperal-
truism (i.e., the willingness to forego reward to spare others from
harm), we observed strongly egoistic tendencies in participants’
unwillingness to harm themselves for others’ benefit. The moral
principle guiding intersubject trade-off decision making observed
in our study is best described as egoistically biased altruism, with
important implications for our understanding of economic and
social interactions in our society.
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Altruistic and egoistic tendencies in making individual deci-sions strongly influence the harmonious functioning of our
society. Economists typically characterize human decision makers as
profoundly selfish when distributing rewards among themselves and
others (1, 2). By contrast, when allocating physical harm to them-
selves and others, seminal work by Crockett et al. has shown that
people are hyperaltruistic (3, 4). Specifically, people are willing to
forego more reward to reduce others’ pain than to spare themselves
from harm, suggesting that they value others’ welfare more than
their own (3). The tension between selfish and (hyper)altruistic
views of human decision making calls into question whether the
principles guiding moral decisions are the same when distributing
rewards versus harms.
Instead, it is possible that harm introduces a new dimension to
moral choice, such that trade-off decisions integrating rewards and
harms are not interchangeable. Support for this hypothesis stems
from human neuroscience, which emphasizes that different neural
circuitries may underlie the representations of reward and harm
(5, 6). In addition, it is not clear whether harm for self and harm
for others are similarly integrated in moral decision making.
Indeed, moral philosophers have distinguished between con-
texts in which agents harm others and those in which they fail to
benefit others (7). Moreover, accepting physical harm to the self to
benefit others (but not the inverse) has sometimes been considered
supererogatory: morally praiseworthy although not required (8, 9).
Therefore, the modality of the cost for the self, i.e., whether
we forgo monetary reward or accept harm in the form of painful
electric shocks may lead to fundamentally different trade-off
decisions. Importantly, Crockett et al. (3, 4) defined hyper-
altruism based on the observation that participants forgo reward
to spare others from harm. However, the complementary case,
i.e., in which participants accept harm to reward others, was not
tested. Given that reward and harm for the self may be distinctly
represented (5, 6), altruistic behavior involving harm for the self
may fundamentally differ from hyperaltruism, which only com-
prises reward for the self and harm for the other (3, 4).
We here sought to address whether moral behavior critically
depends on the modality of consequences and resolve the ten-
sion between the contradictory interpretations of egoistic and
hyperaltrustic tendencies. We adapted a recent approach–avoid
paradigm from research on the representation of reward and
harm in the monkey brain (10, 11). In this paradigm, participants
accepted or rejected offers in which varying monetary rewards
were available, but only in exchange for painful electric shocks at
varying intensities. Using this comprehensive framework, we
evaluated participants’ willingness to accept trade offs when
differing amounts of reward for self or other were combined with
different intensities of harm for self or other.
Sixty-three participants judged offers in two intrapersonal
conditions (reward and harm for the same person) and two in-
terpersonal conditions (reward for one person, harm for the other).
In the “self” condition, participants received both the offered
amount of reward and associated harm—reflecting their individual
trade-off preferences indicated by their choices. In the “other”
condition, participants judged on behalf of another person, who
received both reward and harm. In the harm-for-other condition,
participants imposed harm on the other person to secure rewards
for the self, whereas in the harm-for-self condition, participants
endured harm to gain rewards for the other person (Fig. 1). In each
condition, the same set of offers, comprising specific combinations
of reward and harm (Fig. 2), was presented in a randomized order.
Of note, participants’ actual trade-off decisions were implemented,
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resulting in the allocation of electric shocks and monetary reward
for the self and the next participant.
These conditions lead to clear predictions regarding egoistic
and altruistic behavior. Relative to the self condition, egoistic be-
havior should result in accepting fewer offers in the harm-for-self and
more offers in the harm-for-other condition—and vice versa for al-
truistic behavior (Fig. 2A). Additionally, condition-specific reaction
times (RTs) were compared to determine whether they might engage
different computational processes. Two hypotheses could be tested:
(i) Computational costs depend on the number of persons involved
in the decision (a decision for two takes longer than for one) and
(ii) computational costs depend on identity of the person(s) receiving
shock or reward (deciding if another person will receive the shock
takes longer than deciding if self receives the shock).
Results
Decision Frequencies. To assess general tendencies toward egoistic
and altruistic behavior, we first investigated the acceptance rates
of offers, which significantly differed across conditions [F(3,62) =
21.762, P < 0.001]. Directly comparing conditions, we found that
participants accepted significantly fewer offers in the harm-for-
other condition compared with the self condition [t(62) = 3.186,
P = 0.002], replicating hyperaltruism as introduced by Crockett
et al. (3) (Figs. 2B and 3A). That is, participants were more
willing to forego reward to spare the other from harm than to
spare themselves from harm. However, we also found evidence
for a pronounced egoistic bias. Participants accepted signifi-
cantly fewer offers in the harm-for-self condition compared with
both the self [t(62) = 7.733, P < 0.001] and harm-for-other [t(62) =
3.662, P < 0.001] conditions. Thus, participants were willing to
suffer some degree of shock to financially benefit another per-
son. However, they caused significantly more physical harm to
another person when selecting monetary reward for themselves
compared with the physical harm they were willing to undergo to
gain monetary reward for another person [t(62) = 3.662, P <
0.001]. Hence, the magnitude of egoistic harm avoidance out-
weighed altruistic tendencies.
In addition, harm-for-other and other conditions showed no
significant difference in acceptance rate [t(62) = 1.917, P = 0.06].
Therefore, when harming others, whether the recipient of the re-
ward was the self or the other did nor primarily influence decisions.
Similar acceptance rates between conditions do not necessarily
lead to comparable amounts of accumulated reward and harm in
different conditions. However, when summing the amount of
A B
Fig. 1. (A) Experimental design. After centering the
cursor and noting the response mapping, subjects
made a reject/accept decision for a reward/harm
combination depicted by the length of the green
(reward) and yellow (harm) bars. (B) Payout trials
were randomly selected and subjects received the
indicated amount of reward and harm, if they had
accepted the given trial.
Fig. 2. (A) Predictions. Egoistic decision making would result in an increase in accepted trials in the harm-for-other and a decrease in accepted trials in the
harm-for-self condition, whereas the opposite was predicted for altruistic behavior. (B) Results. The decrease in accepted offers in the harm-for-other con-
dition replicated the notion of hyperaltruism (3, 4). By contrast, decreased willingness to accept offers in the harm-for-self condition is in line with egoistically
motivated behavior. Decision boundaries depict the turning point of rejecting an offer (derived from mixed logistic regression, red dots) to accepting an offer
(green dots). The displayed dots represent the reward/harm offers presented to the subjects and their mean response to a given offer by our cohort.
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reward and harm across accepted trials, both the accumulated re-
ward and the accumulated harm differed across conditions [Fig. S1;
sum of reward: F(3,62) = 23.606, P < 0.001; sum of harm: F(3,62) =
27.762, P < 0.001] in a way that mirrored the acceptance rates.
Additional factors that potentially influence egoistic or altru-
istic decision-making tendencies were assessed. Including partici-
pants’ gender as an additional factor revealed no main effect
[F(1,62) = 0.946, P = 0.335] or interaction [F(3,168) = 0.076, P = 0.969]
for gender on acceptance rates, whereas the main effect of condi-
tion on acceptance rates [F(3,186) = 20.531, P < 0.001] and all sig-
nificant post hoc differences were preserved (all P < 0.05).
Accordingly, including participants’ age as an additional factor did
not result in a significant main effect for age [F(3,168) = 0.032, P =
0.860] or age × condition interaction [F(3,168) = 0.152, P = 0.211].
Similarly, including the order of conditions did not affect the dif-
ference in acceptance rates between conditions, as suggested by the
absence of a main effect order [F(3,62) = 0.867, P = 0.463] or order ×
condition interaction [F(9,186) = 1.384, P = 0.198] when including the
order of conditions as an additional factor in the ANOVA.
Because the timing of the payout of monetary reward and
electric shocks might influence participants’ decisions (e.g.,
learning or habituation; ref. 12), two different payout schedules
were compared between subjects (intermittent payout: n = 31,
end-of-experiment payout: n = 32; see Materials and Methods for
further details). Including the payout schedule (intermittent or
end of experiment) as a between-subjects factor did not show a
main effect [F(3,186) = 0.006, P = 0.936] and no payout schedule ×
condition interaction [F(3,186) = 0.385, P = 0.764] was evident,
whereas a significant effect of condition was still observed
[F(3,62) = 21.546, P < 0.001]. Hence, participants’ decisions did
not differ when administering payout intermittently (every
20 trials) compared with performing the payout for all randomly
selected trials at the end of the experiment. Of note, the number
of payout trials and the selection procedure to identify payout
trials were the same in both versions of the experiment.
Mixed Logistic Regression Models of Moral Decision Making. To
evaluate the individual sensitivities to reward and harm for self and
other, the likelihood of accepting a given offer was modeled using a
mixed logistic regression framework. In accordance with Amemori
and Graybiel (10), we adopted the conditional logit model as a
framework for modeling discrete choices. The models included the
fixed-effect factors reward, harm, and intercept, as well as a random
effect for subject and converged with significant fixed effects for all
factors (all P < 0.001). The computational models allowed us to
disentangle how the magnitude of offered reward and harm drove
decision making across different conditions, as reflected by the ratio
of harm/reward parameter estimates (see Materials and Methods for
further details).
The ratio of harm/reward parameter estimates differed sig-
nificantly across conditions [F(3,62) = 9.496, P < 0.001], with post
hoc t tests indicating significant pairwise differences for all
conditions (all P < 0.011) except between the harm-for-other and
other conditions [t(62) = 0.767, P = 0.446].
In the self condition, participants were influenced by reward
more than harm, indexed by a harm/reward parameter ratio
significantly smaller than 1 (Fig. 3B). A harm/reward ratio of
∼1 indicated a balanced sensitivity to harm and reward in the
harm-for-other and other conditions. In stark contrast, choices in
the harm-for-self condition were primarily driven by avoiding
harm, reflected by a significantly higher harm/reward ratio,
suggesting egoistic motivations.
We then compared the consistency of how participants
weighted harm and reward across conditions. Significant intercorre-
lations were apparent between the self, harm-for-other, and other
conditions. However, the parameters estimated for the harm-for-self
condition did not correlate with parameters from any other condition
(Fig. 4A). In other words, subjects that were more altruistic in the
harm-for-other condition were not necessarily more willing to suffer
harm to benefit the other in the harm-for-self condition.
Representational Similarity Analysis.A model-independent analysis
of condition-specific decision patterns was performed using rep-
resentational similarity analysis (RSA) (13, 14). This model-free
approach results in a multivariate estimate of whether similar
offers were accepted or rejected across conditions. Whereas sim-
ilar acceptance rates can in principle result from accepting dif-
ferent sets of offers across conditions, dissimilarity of decision
patterns readily reflects such differences.
Whereas no difference was observed between the self, harm-
for-other, and other conditions (all P > 0.1), the decision pattern in
the harm-for-self condition was significantly different compared
with all other conditions (all P < 0.001, Fig. 4B). In other words, a
different set of offers was accepted/rejected in the harm-for-self
condition compared with all other conditions, suggesting that
cost–benefit trade-off decisions were derived from distinct processes
and criteria in the harm-for-self condition.
Reaction Times. The comparison of mean reaction times (RTs)
across conditions may help to disambiguate two competing hy-
potheses: (i) Computational costs depend on the number of
persons, i.e., they are greater and hence take longer when
making decisions for two persons rather than one; alternatively
(ii) computational costs depend on the identity of the person(s)
receiving the shock or alternatively, the reward. For example,
they are greater and hence take longer when another person
receives the shock compared with when self receives the shock.
RTs significantly differed across conditions [F(3,62) = 4.549,
P = 0.004; Fig. 5A]. Interestingly, the RT in the self condition
was significantly shorter compared with all other conditions (all
P < 0.001), whereas no significant differences were evident between
all other conditions (all P > 0.828). In other words, reasoning about
another person significantly increased the RTs. Because the RT in
the “other” condition was comparable to the harm-for-other and
harm-for-self condition, representing two distinct recipients simul-
taneously does not further increase computation time compared
with reasoning about the other alone.
When differentiating RTs between accepted or rejected trials
(Fig. 5B), we observed that decisions were significantly faster for
accepted than rejected trials, for all conditions but the harm-for-
Fig. 3. (A) Decisions. The number of accepted trials significantly differed
across conditions [F(3) = 21.762, P < 0.001], showing a significantly lower
acceptance rate for the harm-for-other compared with the self condition,
replicating the notion of hyperaltruism. At the same time, acceptance rate in
the harm-for-self condition was significantly lower compared with all other
conditions, highlighting egoistic tendencies. (B) Model parameters. Whereas
decisions in the self condition were driven by reward rather than harm (as
reflected by a harm/reward ratio <1), participants primarily based their de-
cisions on the amount of harm rather than reward in the harm-for-self
condition (as reflected by a harm/reward ratio >1).
























self condition [decision × condition interaction: F(3,168) = 7.636,
P < 0.001, post hoc t tests for decision: all P < 0.001, harm-for-
self condition: t(62) = 1.157, P = 0.250]. Hence, the difference in
RTs for accepted and rejected trials supports the notion that
different mechanisms were influencing decision making in the
harm-for-self condition (Fig. 5B).
Discussion
Our findings revealed that individuals make both altruistic as well as
egoistic choices, depending on the modality of the consequence for
the self. Participants were willing to forego monetary reward to
spare others from physical harm. However, they were not eager to
inflict harm on themselves to secure rewards for the other. Even
participants who were less harm averse in the self condition (i.e.,
accepting most trade offs) were hesitant to accept the same offers
when another person received the resulting reward. Importantly,
modality-dependent altruism and egoism were uncorrelated within
individuals. For example, a participant might forego a large amount
of reward to spare someone else from harm—but not suffer even
modest harm for someone else’s benefit.
Taken together, our current results are inconsistent both with
economic models of pure self-interest (1, 2) and with universal
altruism. Replicating previous findings, our data support the no-
tion of hyperaltruism when decisions concern harm for others (3,
4); however, the same is not true for decisions involving harm for
self. Because the modality of the consequences for the self is so
crucial, the capacity for genuine altruism is qualified by an egoistic
bias. In the intersubject conditions, the hyperaltruism effect (i.e.,
avoid harming others) was outweighed by participants’ egoistic
harm avoidance. The emerging behavioral patterns are best de-
scribed as modality-dependent egoistically biased altruism.
One explanation for the modality specificity of altruism may
lie in the fact that distinct neural circuitry facilitates the repre-
sentation and integration of reward and harm (6, 10, 11) in hu-
mans and other animals. From an evolutionary perspective,
distinct neural processing of possible rewards and harms may be
explained by the different (social) contexts in which trade-off
decisions were encountered. The distribution of rewards might
primarily occur in positive situations, e.g., distributing the out-
come of a successful collaboration like hunting in a group (15).
In such circumstances, the willingness to reduce personal benefit
(reward) by sharing with others may facilitate group cohesion
(16, 17). Indeed, the tendency to help others without immediate
benefit for the self emerges early in human development (18). By
contrast, making decisions involving harm might more typically
arise in negative contexts, for example, during life-threatening
conflicts. Here, reducing harm to the self may be strongly pri-
oritized over potential benefit for others (19). In other words, the
moral interchangeability of reward and harm may be a modern
concept, appealing to us on grounds of philosophical and eco-
nomic consistency. From an evolutionary standpoint, however,
the moral evaluation of trade-off decisions may have been highly
modality dependent: Failing to benefit others and actively
harming them were not the same thing.
Consistent with this conjecture, evidence for distinct neural
computations of harm for self and others has recently been
reported by Crockett et al., who showed that neural activity in
lateral prefrontal cortex specifically encodes profit obtained by
harming others, but not harming oneself (20). In addition,
functional connectivity between lateral prefrontal cortex and
dorsal striatum mediated a shift in the reward-related response
of the dorsal striatum to monetary gain. These results suggest
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Fig. 4. (A) Model parameter correlations. Correlating model parameters (reward/harm ratio) across conditions revealed significant intercorrelations for all
conditions except the harm-for-self condition. Hence, participants who were most prone to spare others from harm at the cost of minimizing their own
reward, were not necessarily most willing to harm themselves to reward others, underlining the modality dependence of altruism. (B) Decision pattern
dissimilarity. A completely independent, multivariate analyses of response patterns across conditions revealed a significantly dissimilar decision pattern in the
harm-for-self condition compared with all other conditions, highlighting that allocating harm to oneself, although benefiting others, is governed by pro-
foundly different mechanisms compared with decision making in all other conditions.
Fig. 5. Reaction time differences between condi-
tions. (A) RTs significantly differed across conditions,
with subjects taking more time in any condition in-
volving another person compared with the self
condition. Of note, RTs did not differ between the
conditions involving another person (harm for other,
harm for self, and other). (B) When differentiating
RTs by decisions, accepted trials were found to fea-
ture significantly lower reaction times compared
with rejected trials for all but the harm-for-self
condition, where no significant difference was ob-
served. This systematic difference further supports
differential mechanistic underpinnings for decision
making in the harm-for-self condition.
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that the neural mechanisms of moral decision making are sen-
sitive to the identity of the individual who receives painful
electric shocks (20, 21). Importantly, Crockett et al. (20) focused
on moral decisions involving harming others for personal gain
but did not address decisions involving harming oneself to re-
ward others. Therefore, future neuroscientific work is needed to
further characterize the neural underpinnings of recipient- and
modality-specific moral decision making.
An alternative explanation of modality specificity in altruism
stems from the uncertainty inherent in estimating how others
experience harmful events. Of note, compared with the self
condition, participants accepted fewer offers in the “other”
condition (Fig. 3A), suggesting a priority to reduce harm rather
than maximize gain for others. However, it is important to note
that uncertainty alone cannot explain hyperaltruism. Without a
tendency to care for the well-being of others, uncertainty about
their subjective experience of harm would not preclude partici-
pants from shocking others for monetary gain.
Appropriate interpretations of empirical findings addressing
egoistic and altruistic tendencies in moral decision making are
contingent on the specific experimental context. We here used a
minimal moral context, providing no information about the other
person and excluding opportunities for reciprocity. One might
argue that such a minimal context may be limited in its appli-
cability to real-world interactions, where the identity of the other
person is typically known and reciprocity is possible. However,
the increasing relevance of social media interactions occurring in
such minimal moral contexts emphasizes the importance of un-
derstanding their normative principles. Moreover, only a mini-
mal moral context allows for an evaluation of egoistic and
altruistic tendencies, unbiased by the identity of the other person
and idiosyncratic strategies accounting for reciprocity. There-
fore, the minimal moral context provides an essential baseline
comparison for future research in richer social contexts, for ex-
ample, when group membership or behavioral dispositions of the
other person are known. Moreover, personal and demographic
characteristics of participants may impact on moral decision-
making behavior. In particular, developmental changes during
adolescence and beyond in brain circuitry involved in moral and
reward-based decision making might result in age-dependent
differences in behavior (for example, see ref. 22). Although age
did not impact on acceptance rates in our primarily late ado-
lescent cohort, we cannot be certain that the observed behavioral
patterns are identical in other age ranges. Therefore, the effects
of age and other personal and demographic characteristics
should be addressed by future research.
Ultimately, our results should not be interpreted as evidence
contradicting the notion that human beings can be genuinely
altruistic. In fact, participants still accepted a considerable
fraction of offers in the harm-for-self condition, in the absence
of any personal gain. The fact that this genuine altruism was
outweighed by participants’ willingness to impose harm on
others for their own benefit emphasizes rather the crucial
modality dependence of altruism. From a practical perspective,
this modality dependence highlights that the framing of trade-
off decisions may critically bias our responses. For example, the
perception of policy making involving a trade off between
the interests of different groups, may profoundly differ, de-
pending on whether consequences are presented as a forgoing
benefit to spare others from harm versus accepting harm for
others’ benefit.
In conclusion, the present work suggests that modality-specific
processing of rewards and harms may have a strong impact on
individuals’ propensities to exhibit egoistic and altruistic behav-
ior. Therefore, it is ultimately short sighted to envision humans
either as categorically egoistic or altruistic. Rather, we propose
an integrated framework of modality-dependent moral decision
making, recognizing that the possibility of genuine altruism is
embedded in context-dependent egoistic bias, construing de-
cision makers as egoistically biased altruists.
Materials and Methods
Participants and Procedure. Sixty-three healthy subjects were recruited at the
University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) and they provided written
informed consent (41 female, mean age: 19.7 ± 2.7 y). This study was ap-
proved by the local ethics committee (UCSB Institutional Review Board no.
34–16-0964). Participants were given complete and comprehensive instruc-
tions regarding all aspects of the task both verbally and with accompanying
visual demonstrations, and they practiced using the joystick to indicate re-
sponse options in a trial version of the self condition.
Before completing the task, participants were informed about the im-
plications of decisions for self and other. In particular, participants were
informed that they would receive (i) both monetary reward and electric
shocks resulting from their own choices, as well as (ii) monetary reward and
electric shocks resulting from the previous participant’s decisions (in the
harm-for-other and “other” conditions). Hence, monetary rewards accu-
mulated by the previous participant in the harm-for-self and “other” con-
ditions, as well as harm accumulated in the harm-for-other and “other”
conditions were administered to the present participant. Importantly, the
administration of both reward and harm (from both decisions of the present
participant and those of the past participant) took place after the partici-
pants had fully completed all conditions of the task. This experimental de-
sign avoids any influence of the trade-off decisions of the previous
participant on the trade-off decisions of the present participant.
Participants were also informed that their decisions in respective condi-
tions would be administered to the next participant. Importantly, partici-
pants’ actual trade-off decisions were carried out, i.e., the next participant
indeed received the monetary reward as allocated in the harm-for-self and
“other” condition and the electric shocks as allocated in the harm-for-other
and “other” condition. Participants had no personal interaction with past or
future participants and no knowledge of the identity or personal charac-
teristics of past or future participants. This limitation is crucial, given our aim
of constructing a minimal moral context, which provides participants with
no knowledge about the identity of the other person and affords no op-
portunities for reciprocity.
To ensure that electric shocks had a similar aversive value across subjects,
the shock intensities used in the experiment were individualized using a
standardized procedure (for example, see refs. 1, 2). Participants then
completed all four conditions in a randomized order, which was counter-
balanced across subjects. Each condition comprised 100 trade-off decisions
with distinct combinations of reward and harm. These combinations were
identical for all subjects and conditions, but were presented in different
randomized orders. Apart from the introduction screen (indicating the up-
coming condition), visual stimuli were identical across conditions. Every
20 trials, participants were presented a payout screen (Fig. 1B), indicating
the reward/harm combination from a randomly selected trial. Because every
offer could be selected for payout, participants were instructed to treat each
offer as if it would be administered. If participants had accepted the selected
payout trade off, corresponding reward and harm were administered to the
appropriate target(s). If participants rejected the randomly selected trial,
neither reward nor harm was administered.
The timing of the payout might have a considerable impact on partici-
pants’ decisions (3). On the one hand, administering reward and harm at the
end of the experiment may result in reduced task engagement and render
participants skeptical about the veridical nature of the payout. On the other
hand, intermittent payout administration may dynamically impact subjective
reward/harm trade offs across blocks of trials and thereby create a confound
across conditions. To rule out that either of these possibilities considerably
impacted on our findings, we administered all payouts at the end of the ex-
periment for 31 participants (2), whereas the other 32 participants received
intermittent payouts after every 20 trials. In either case, participants received
the actual harm and reward as determined by the previous participant after
finishing all four conditions.
Delivery of Painful Shocks. Electric shock configuration and pain thresholding
were adapted from Seymour et al. (21). Two adhesive electrodes were placed
on the back of the left hand with gel applied to increase skin conductivity.
Electric current was delivered to cause an aversive sensation that becomes
increasingly painful as the current is increased. For each electric shock, direct
current was administered for a duration of 1 s at a frequency of 100 Hz with a
2-ms square waveform. Shocks were administered using a PowerLab 26T de-
vice with the LabChart software package (ADInstruments Ltd), which is US
Food and Drug Administration approved for human and clinical use.
























Shock intensities were individualized with the intention of producing
comparable subjective aversiveness across participants. Shocks were admin-
istered starting at extremely low currents and increasing at graduated in-
tensities until tolerance was reached. No shocks above this subjectively
determined tolerance level were administered. Next, 14 subtolerance in-
tensities were randomly defined and delivered to the participants. For these
shocks, participants indicated the subjective pain level using a visual analog
scale (VAS) ranging from 0 to 10. A sigmoid function was subsequently fitted
to the VAS response values, describing the relationship between shock in-
tensity and pain perception for each individual. Based on this sigmoid
function, an intensity equivalent to a pain rating of 8 out of 10 on the VAS
was fixed as the maximum shock intensity.
Trade-Off Decision Making. In the present study, we adapted for human
subjects the approach–avoidance decision task initially introduced by Ame-
mori and Graybiel for macaques (10, 11), using PsychoPy (23).
On each trial, participants used a custom-built joystick to indicate their
decision to accept or reject the offer (for task, see Fig. 1). First, to indicate
readiness and to initiate the trial, participants had to move the cursor to the
center of the screen. Once the cursor was centered, the response options in-
dicating acceptance and rejection of the given offer were displayed at the top
and bottom of the screen. One second later, the offer was presented in the
center of the screen in the form of two horizontal bars, with the top green
bar indicating the available reward and the bottom yellow bar indicating
the available harm. The magnitude of reward and harm was indicated by the
length of the respective bars, which independently varied between trials. The
maximum amounts of reward ($2) and harm (shock intensity equivalent to 8
VAS) were always indicated by black bounding boxes around the horizontal
bars. Subjects were instructed to reject or accept the offer as quickly as possible
by using the joystick to move the cursor to the respective response options.
The location of the options, i.e., whether the joystick had to be moved toward
or away from the subject to accept an offer, was randomized across trials.
After indication of their response, a visual feedback was displayed, indicating
the acceptance or rejection of the offer.
A randomly selected payout trial was indicated after completion of every
20 trials (Fig. 1B). If the randomly selected trial was an offer accepted by the
subject, both reward and harm were administered, whereas neither re-
ward nor harm was allocated for rejected offers. For half of the subjects
(n = 31), the indicated reward and harm were administered immediately,
whereas for the remaining participants (n = 32), payouts from all condi-
tions were allocated at the end of the experiment. All 100 trials of a given
condition were completed before moving on to the next condition, with a
randomized order of conditions that was counterbalanced across subjects.
Data Analysis. Data were analyzed using three complementary approaches:
(i) comparison of response frequencies and reaction times, (ii) mixed-effects
modeling of trade-off decision making, and (iii) RSA comparing decision
making patterns across conditions.
Acceptance rates were assessed using one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) including condition as a factor, using ezANOVA-package for R (24).
Post hoc t tests were subsequently conducted to compare condition-specific
differences. Similarly, reaction times between conditions were compared
using the same analytical framework. Moreover, reaction times were sepa-
rately analyzed for accepted and rejected trials.
To address the respective impact of the reward and harm magnitude on
condition-specific decision making, reject/accept decisions were modeled as a
function of reward and harm usingmixed logistic regressions as implemented
in lme4-package for R. In accordance with Amemori and Graybiel (10), we
adopted the conditional logit model, which is a popular framework for
modeling discrete choices. We used the winning model of the model com-
parison (4), which characterizes decisions as a linear combination of the
available reward x and harm y:
fðx, yÞ= a1  x+ a2  y+ a3,
with a reward coefficient a1, a harm coefficient a2, and an intercept a3.
Whereas a1 and a2 reflect how participants weighted the magnitude of the
offered reward and harm, a3 allowed for flexibility in participants’motivations
to maximize reward or avoid harm overall. Separate models were fitted for
each condition, including fixed effects for reward and harm alongside a ran-
dom effect for subject. Resulting parameter estimates were compared across
conditions using an ANOVA in line with the analysis of acceptance frequencies.
In Figs. 3 and 4, the ratios of parameter estimates a2/a1 across conditions are
depicted, representing the relative influence of harm and reward.
A model-independent multivariate analysis of condition-specific decision
patterns was performed using RSA (13, 14). The goal of this analysis was to
compare the multivariate distance of response patterns, i.e., all 100 binary
choices (reject/accept) within each condition. This comparison is possible be-
cause the same set of offers was presented in each condition. We used Jaccard
distance as a metric for the binary choices. The benefit of analyzing decision
patterns using RSA lies in the fact that information on the parameter space is
readily represented. For example, similar acceptance rates between conditions
may result from accepting highly different sets of offers, reflecting different
decision-making principles. Whereas these differences would also be partially
reflected by model parameter estimates from the mixed-logistic regression,
our RSA approach complements explicit modeling of the parameters. In
principle, RSA can detect differences in acceptance patterns that are in-
dependent of model assumptions. By combining RSA with mixed-effects lo-
gistic regression, we gain greater sensitivity to divergences in participant
response across conditions. Similarly, multivariate analysis of distances in re-
sponse times offers insight into whether or not overlapping sets of trials drive
similarity or dissimilarity across conditions in mean response time. The statis-
tical significance of each pairwise distance was assessed via one-sample t test.
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